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OPINION 
_______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.  
 
 In this case, SmithKline Beecham Corporation, doing 
business as GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”), seeks to enforce a 
court-approved settlement agreement and enjoin the State of 
Louisiana, through its Attorney General, from bringing 
allegedly released claims against GSK in the Louisiana state 
courts.  Louisiana protests this enforcement action on the 
theory that the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States bars its involuntary inclusion in the settlement 
agreement.   
 To resolve this dispute, we must answer two questions:  
First, does a motion for approval of a class action settlement 
qualify as a suit against a state for Eleventh Amendment 
purposes if the requested settlement agreement enjoins a state 
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from suing in a state court?  Second, if the Eleventh 
Amendment does cover this motion for settlement approval, 
may GSK avoid the Eleventh Amendment’s prohibition by 
showing that Louisiana waived its sovereign immunity?  We 
find that the Eleventh Amendment covers this motion and that 
GSK may not avoid its bar. 
 In addition to this claim, GSK asserts that the District 
Court abused its discretion in denying Rule 60(b) relief from a 
final judgment.  We find this argument unavailing.  On these 
two grounds, we will affirm.   
I. 
 On July 14, 2008, private indirect purchasers of 
Flonase, a brand-name prescription drug, sued GSK in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  They alleged that:  (a) GSK had filed sham 
citizen petitions with the Food and Drug Administration to 
delay the introduction of a generic version of Flonase, and (b) 
this delay forced the private indirect purchasers to pay more 
for Flonase than they would have if the generic version were 
available.  The private indirect purchasers sued on behalf of 
themselves and a class of other indirect purchasers.  For the 
purpose of the case at bar, two motions matter.   
 First, in the primary suit, the private indirect purchasers 
moved for final approval of settlement on April 1, 2013, after 
the District Court had certified the class, and had approved of 
the notice to settlement class members.  The State of Louisiana, 
an indirect Flonase purchaser, qualified as a potential class 
member but did not receive the approved notice.  Instead, it 
only received a Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) Notice.  
This notice, “serve[d] upon the appropriate State official of 
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each State in which a class member resides,” included:  (1) “a 
copy of the complaint,” (2) “notice of any scheduled judicial 
hearing in the class action,” (3) “any proposed or final 
notification to class members,” (4) “any proposed . . . class 
action settlement,” and (5) an estimate of the number of class 
members in each state.  28 U.S.C. § 1715(b) (2012).  The notice 
includes this information because Congress “designed [this 
notice requirement] to ensure that a responsible state and/or 
federal official receives information about proposed class 
action settlements and is in a position to react if the settlement 
appears unfair to some or all class members or inconsistent 
with applicable regulatory policies.”  S. Rep. No. 109–14, at 
31 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 32.  It made 
clear, however, that state officials “will not be required” to “get 
involved.”  Id. at 33.  
 The requested court order “permanently enjoined” all 
members of the settlement class, including Louisiana, from 
bringing released claims against GSK, even in Louisiana’s 
state court.  Pls.’ Mot. Final Approval Settlement and Plan 
Allocation, Award Att’ys’ Fees, Reimbursement Expenses and 
Incentive Awards Named Pls. at 9-10, In re Flonase Antitrust 
Litig., No. CV 08-3301, 2015 WL 9273274 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 
2015), ECF No. 574 [hereinafter Motion for Final Approval of 
Settlement Plan].  The proposed settlement agreement, among 
other things, provided compensation to the plaintiffs and class 
members, released the plaintiffs’ and class members’ claims, 
“reserv[ed] exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the 
Settlement and this Settlement Agreement” for the District 
Court, and gave GSK the power to enforce the settlement.  
App. 98–107.  On June 19, 2013, the District Court approved 
the final settlement. 
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 Second, in the ancillary suit, GSK filed a motion to 
enforce the settlement agreement against the Louisiana 
Attorney General because, according to GSK, Louisiana 
violated the settlement agreement.  In its motion, GSK argued 
that “Louisiana did not opt-out of the Settlement Class, and 
thus is bound by the release and covenant not to sue provisions 
in the Settlement Agreement and Final Order and Judgment.”  
App. 314.  As a result, GSK “respectfully submit[ted] that this 
Court should enjoin the Louisiana Attorney General from 
further pursuit of claims that were encompassed by the 
settlement in this litigation.”  App. 315.   
 On December 21, 2015, the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied this request and 
dismissed the case.  It held that the Eleventh Amendment 
covered this enforcement action because, pursuant to the 
Eleventh Amendment, “a State retains the autonomy to choose 
‘not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may be 
sued.’”  App. 12 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984)).  See also App. 14 (“Even 
though some of Louisiana’s claims fall within the Settlement 
Agreement, I cannot enjoin Louisiana unless the State has 
waived its sovereign immunity and consented to this Court’s 
jurisdiction.”).  It then held that “Louisiana’s receipt of the 
CAFA Notice is insufficient to unequivocally demonstrate that 
the State was aware that it was a class member and voluntarily 
chose to have its claims resolved by the Settlement 
Agreement.”  App. 17.   
 Shortly before the District Court decided GSK’s motion 
to enjoin Louisiana’s state court action, GSK moved pursuant 
to Rule 60(b)(2) for Relief from a Judgment or Order because 
of newly discovered evidence that a third party had allegedly 
submitted a settlement claim on behalf of Louisiana.  On May 
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31, 2016, the District Court denied this motion.  GSK appealed 
the December 21 and May 31 orders.   
II. 
 Because we review the District Court’s final decisions, 
we exercise jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  “Dismissal of an action based upon sovereign 
immunity is subject to plenary review by this Court.” Blanciak 
v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 694 (3d Cir. 1996).  
“We review the denial of Rule 60(b) relief for an abuse of 
discretion.”  Coltec Indus., Inc. v. Hobgood, 280 F.3d 262, 269 
(3d Cir. 2002).  
III. 
 The District Court:  (a) properly granted Louisiana’s 
Motion to Dismiss, (b) appropriately denied GSK’s Motion to 
Enforce Class Settlement, and (c) did not abuse its discretion 
in denying GSK’s Rule 60(b) motion.  As a result, we will 
affirm. 
 This case turns on whether the District Court exercised 
jurisdiction over Louisiana in the primary suit.  A private party 
may bring a suit against a state official to enforce a settlement 
agreement despite the Eleventh Amendment.  Frew ex rel. 
Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 440 (2004).  To enforce a 
settlement agreement, a private party must draw upon a federal 
court’s ancillary jurisdiction.  Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 
Co., 511 U.S. 375, 379–80 (1994).  “Ancillary jurisdiction may 
extend to claims having a factual and logical dependence on 
the primary lawsuit, but that primary lawsuit must contain an 
independent basis for federal jurisdiction.”  Peacock v. 
Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 355 (1996) (internal quotation marks 
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and citation omitted).  As a result, GSK may not draw upon the 
District Court’s powers of ancillary jurisdiction unless the 
District Court properly exercised jurisdiction over the State in 
approving the settlement agreement.  In approving the 
settlement agreement, the District Court lacked jurisdiction 
over the State because the Eleventh Amendment applies to the 
primary case and because Louisiana did not waive its sovereign 
immunity in that case.     
A. 
 The Eleventh Amendment applies to the primary suit.  
The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power 
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit 
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State.”  U.S. Const. amend. XI.   
 The Supreme Court has defined a “suit” as “the 
prosecution, or pursuit, of some claim, demand, or request” and 
regarded “commenced or prosecuted” as follows:  “By a suit 
commenced by an individual against a State, we should 
understand process sued out by that individual against the 
State, for the purpose of establishing some claim against it by 
the judgment of a Court; and the prosecution of that suit is its 
continuance.”  Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 407–08 
(1821).  “[A] suit is against the sovereign if the judgment 
sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, 
or interfere with the public administration, or if the effect of 
the judgment would be to restrain the Government from acting, 
or to compel it to act.”  Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S. 
at 102 n. 11 (1984) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted) (emphasis added).  
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 In Missouri v. Fiske, the Supreme Court found that the 
Eleventh Amendment applied to a motion to enjoin a state from 
suing in its own court.  290 U.S. 18, 26 (1933).  The Supreme 
Court came to this conclusion because the Eleventh 
Amendment covers claims that seek equitable remedies and 
because the private party’s motion to enjoin the State from 
suing in its own court qualified as a suit that sought an 
equitable remedy.  Id. at 27.  
 Like the private parties in Fiske, the private parties here 
sought an equitable remedy against a State.  In their motion for 
final approval of settlement, the private indirect purchasers 
asked the District Court to order that “all members of the 
Settlement Class[, including Louisiana,] . . . are hereby 
permanently enjoined” from bringing any of the released 
claims against GSK “in any state or federal court . . . .”  Motion 
for Final Approval of Settlement Plan at 9–10.  Because Fiske 
held that the Eleventh Amendment covers a motion to enjoin a 
state from suing in its own court and because the motion for 
final settlement approval sought to enjoin Louisiana from 
suing in its own court, the Eleventh Amendment covers the 
motion for final approval of settlement at issue here.  
 Procedurally, Fiske differs from the case at bar in two 
respects.  Neither distinction, however, undermines Fiske’s 
utility or applicability.  First, the States played a different role 
in each claim.  In Fiske, the private parties sought an injunction 
against a state that acted as an intervening defendant.  290 U.S. 
at 23–24.  Here, private parties sought an injunction against a 
state that acted as an absent class member.   
 This distinction between the States’ procedural titles 
does not make Fiske less useful.  The Supreme Court has 
instructed us to focus on the nature of the claim’s requested 
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relief, as opposed to the “mere names of the titular parties,” In 
re New York, 256 U.S. 490, 500 (1921), and, “in the context of 
lawsuits against state and federal employees or entities,” the 
Supreme Court has ruled that “courts should look to whether 
the sovereign is the real party in interest to determine whether 
sovereign immunity bars the suit.”  Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 
1285, 1290 (2017).  To make this decision, “courts may not 
simply rely on the characterization of the parties in the 
complaint, but rather must determine in the first instance 
whether the remedy sought is truly against the sovereign.”  Id. 
at 1290.  If we must look beyond “the characterization of the 
parties in the complaint” and, instead, scrutinize the requested 
remedy’s effects to ensure that it does not infringe upon an 
unnamed sovereign’s immunity, we should surely adopt the 
same approach here when considering whether a claim 
implicates the rights of a state acting as an absent class 
member.  Id.  
 Second, the private parties sought equitable relief in 
different types of motions.  In Fiske, the private parties filed an 
“ancillary and supplemental bill of complaint,” Fiske, 290 U.S. 
at 24, and requested “the equitable remedy of injunction 
against the state.”  Id. at 27.  Here, the private parties asked for 
the approval of a settlement agreement in which the state was 
“hereby permanently enjoined . . . .”  Motion for Final 
Approval of Settlement Plan at 9.   
 The specific name of the vessel requested to carry the 
injunction does not distinguish Fiske from the case at bar.  The 
Supreme Court has acknowledged a consent decree’s 
hybridity.  On the one hand, “[a] consent decree no doubt 
embodies an agreement of the parties and thus in some respects 
is contractual in nature.”  Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 
502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992).  On the other hand, “it is an 
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agreement that the parties desire and expect will be reflected 
in, and be enforceable as, a judicial decree that is subject to the 
rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees.”  Id.  
Because of this ambiguity, the Supreme Court has established 
a rule to determine whether a settlement agreement carries the 
force of federal law and has held that a settlement agreement 
becomes enforceable federal law when it:  (a) receives a federal 
court’s approval, (b) “springs from a federal dispute,” and (c) 
“furthers the objectives of federal law.”  Hawkins, 540 U.S. at 
438.   
 As GSK concedes, this settlement agreement “was 
functionally a consent decree” that “federal courts may 
enforce.”  Appellant’s Br. at 35.  As a result, Fiske applies 
even though the private parties in Fiske requested an injunction 
in the form of a court order—as opposed to in the form of a 
court approved settlement agreement.  
 Another court of appeals has come to a similar 
conclusion, albeit in a slightly different situation.  In Thomas 
v. FAG Bearings Corp., the Eighth Circuit found that “the 
Eleventh Amendment bars involuntary joinder of” a state 
because “[i]nvoluntary joinder will compel [the state] to act by 
forcing it to prosecute [a private party] at a time and place 
dictated by the federal courts.”  50 F.3d 502, 505 (8th Cir. 
1995).  The Eighth Circuit supported its conclusion by noting 
that “[p]ermitting coercive joinder also undermines the two 
aims of the Eleventh Amendment: protection for a state’s 
autonomy and protection for its pocketbook.”  Id. at 506.  
According to our sister circuit, a contrary ruling would 
undermine the Amendment’s aims by:  (a) allowing a private 
party to waive a state’s sovereign immunity, and (b) 
compelling “[p]remature litigation [that] potentially limits the 
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costs [the state] can recover.”  Id.  These same concerns 
motivate our decision today.  
 GSK preemptively questions our holding by citing three 
Supreme Court cases that held that the Eleventh Amendment 
did not cover a private party’s suit involving a state.  In the first 
case, Cohens, the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh 
Amendment did not cover a criminal defendant’s appeal from 
a state court to the Supreme Court of the United States on a 
writ of error.  19 U.S. at 407–08.  In the second case, California 
v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., the Supreme Court found that the 
Eleventh Amendment did not apply to an in rem complaint 
over a sunken ship that the State of California claimed as its 
own after the private party filed the in rem suit.  523 U.S. 491, 
496 (1998).  In the third case, Tennessee Student Assistance 
Corp. v. Hood, the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh 
Amendment did not apply to discharge orders in in rem 
bankruptcy proceedings even though a state agency had 
guaranteed the allegedly dischargeable loan.  541 U.S. 440, 
449 (2004).  
 In addition to these Supreme Court cases, GSK relies on 
three sister circuit cases that held that motions to remove or 
transfer did not implicate the Eleventh Amendment. Cal. ex 
rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 845, 848 (9th Cir. 
2004) (observing that “Cohens counsels strongly that removal 
does not constitute the commencement or prosecution of a suit” 
and holding that “a state that voluntarily brings suit as a 
plaintiff in state court cannot invoke the Eleventh Amendment 
when the defendant seeks removal to a federal court of 
competent jurisdiction”); Okla. ex rel. Edmondson v. Magnolia 
Marine Transp. Co., 359 F.3d 1237, 1240 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(“We hold that the State may not assert its Eleventh 
Amendment immunity to preclude defendants’ removal of the 
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tort action it brought against them in its own courts.”); Regents 
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1565 
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (finding “that the Eleventh Amendment does 
not deprive the Indiana district court of jurisdiction in this 
case” because “it does not involve any claim or counterclaim 
against [the state] that places [the state] in the position of a 
defendant”). 
 We distinguish these Supreme Court and sister circuit 
cases from the case at bar because none of the private parties 
in the cases cited by GSK sought legal or equitable remedies 
against the State.  Indeed they sought a writ of jurisdiction that 
“acts only on the record,” Cohens, 19 U.S. at 410, a removal 
notice that was not “dissimilar” from a writ of jurisdiction, 
Dynegy, 375 F.3d at 845,1 a transfer motion that “does not 
involve any claim or counterclaim against” the State, Eli Lilly 
& Co., 119 F.3d at 1565,2 an in rem admiralty action where the 
“the possession of the” sovereign was not “invaded under 
process of the court,” Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 507, and 
an in rem bankruptcy determination not “seeking to recover 
                                              
1  GSK unsuccessfully sought to remove Louisiana’s state court 
case to the United States District Court for the Middle District 
of Louisiana.  Ruling and Order, Louisiana v. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., No. 15-cv-00055 (M.D. La. Feb. 4, 2015), 
ECF No. 38.  As GSK’s counsel conceded at Oral Argument, 
this issue is not before us.  
2 While the removal notice was pending in the Middle District 
of Louisiana, GSK futilely tried to transfer the case from the 
Middle District of Louisiana to the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  Louisiana v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 
15-cv-00055, (M.D. La. Feb. 4, 2015), ECF No. 36.  
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property in the State’s hands,” Hood, 541 U.S. at 441–42.  As 
a result, we conclude that the Eleventh Amendment applies 
here.  
B. 
 The Eleventh Amendment prevented the District Court 
from issuing an injunction against Louisiana because 
Louisiana did not waive its sovereign immunity.  A suit may 
avoid the Eleventh Amendment’s broad prohibition in three 
ways.  “First, Congress may authorize such a suit in the 
exercise of its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment—
an Amendment enacted after the Eleventh Amendment and 
specifically designed to alter the federal-state balance.  Second, 
a State may waive its sovereign immunity by consenting to 
suit.”  Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999) (internal citation 
omitted).  Third, a private party may sue a state official to 
prevent the official from violating federal law.  Ex parte Young, 
209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908).  GSK argues that Louisiana 
waived its sovereign immunity.  We disagree.  
 The State of Louisiana did not waive its sovereign 
immunity by receiving a CAFA notice and by failing to oppose 
the settlement based on that notice.  A state waives its 
immunity “if the State makes a ‘clear declaration’ that it 
intends to submit itself to our jurisdiction.”  Coll. Sav. Bank, 
527 U.S. at 675–76 (citation omitted).  The law “requir[es] a 
‘clear declaration’ by the State of its waiver” to ensure “that 
the State in fact consents to suit” and because “there is little 
reason to assume actual consent based upon the State’s mere 
presence in a field subject to congressional regulation.”  Id. at 
680. 
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 In College Savings Bank, a private party sued a state for 
infringing upon a patent.  Id. at 671.  The private party argued 
that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the suit because the 
State “constructively waived its immunity from suit by 
engaging in the voluntary and nonessential activity . . . after 
being put on notice by the clear language of the [Act] that it 
would be subject to . . . liability for doing so.”  Id. at 680.  The 
Supreme Court rejected this argument and found that the State 
did not voluntarily consent to federal jurisdiction by engaging 
in “voluntary and nonessential activity” because “[t]here is a 
fundamental difference between a State’s expressing 
unequivocally that it waives its immunity and Congress’s 
expressing unequivocally its intention that if the State takes 
certain action it shall be deemed to have waived that 
immunity.”  Id. at 680–81. 
 In Lapides v. Board of Regents of University System of 
Georgia, the Supreme Court applied this test and came to a 
different conclusion.  535 U.S. 613, 620 (2002).  In that case, 
a private party sued a state official and the State removed the 
case to federal court.  Id.  Once in federal court, the state 
claimed sovereign immunity.  Id.  The Court observed that 
College Savings did “require[] a ‘clear’ indication of the 
State’s intent to waive its immunity” and held that “[t]he 
relevant ‘clarity’ here must focus on the litigation act the State 
takes that creates the waiver.  And that act—removal—is 
clear.”  Id.   
 In light of College Savings Bank and Lapides, Louisiana 
did not clearly indicate its intent to waive its sovereign 
immunity in the primary suit.  It received a CAFA notice.  That 
notice may not “impose any obligations, duties, or 
responsibilities upon . . . State officials.”  28 U.S.C. § 1715(f).  
After it received this notice, it did not act, in its capacity either 
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as a litigant, as was the case in Lapides, or as a market 
participant, as was the case in College Savings Bank.  As a 
result, we reject GSK’s argument and hold that Louisiana did 
not waive its sovereign immunity in the primary suit by merely 
receiving a CAFA notice and failing to act.  
 GSK attempts to refute this argument in three ways.  We 
find none of them persuasive.  First, it attempts to distinguish 
College Savings Bank by arguing that College Savings Bank 
announced “the test for whether States consented to federal 
jurisdiction by enacting statutes or otherwise engaging in non-
litigation conduct that Congress specified would abrogate 
immunity” and that Lapides “governs whether a State’s 
litigation conduct waives immunity.”  Appellant’s Reply at 18.  
This argument lacks merit because the Court decided Lapides 
and College Savings Bank under the same rule.  Indeed, in 
Lapides, the Court observed that College Saving Bank 
“required a ‘clear’ indication of the State’s intent to waive its 
immunity” and concluded that, in Lapides, “that act—
removal—is clear.”  Id. at 620. 
 Second, GSK argues that “Louisiana cites no authority 
suggesting that only affirmative litigation acts can waive 
immunity.”  Appellant’s Reply at 19.  This characterization 
misconstrues Louisiana’s argument.  Louisiana does not argue 
that only affirmative litigation acts can waive immunity.  
Instead, it argues that a state cannot waive its immunity merely 
by receiving notice and failing to act.  Appellee’s Br. at 23 
(“Sovereign immunity . . .  requires something more than 
silence or inaction before a state can be bound by a federal 
proceeding.”).  This distinction matters because, as explained 
above, College Savings supports the State’s actual position.  
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 Third, GSK asserts, without citation, that “it does not 
follow that sovereign immunity must afford States more 
protection against becoming absent class members than what 
ordinary litigants receive under Rule 23.”  Appellant’s Reply 
at 19.  It reasons that States should not receive more protection 
because “States are far more sophisticated than ordinary 
litigants, and understand the significance of litigation conduct 
far better.”  Id. at 19.  This argument misses the point.  The 
Constitution requires more protections for States than for 
ordinary litigants not because of their sophistication but 
because of their status as sovereigns.  P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer 
Auth., v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993) (“The 
Amendment is rooted in a recognition that the States, although 
a union, maintain certain attributes of sovereignty, including 
sovereign immunity.”).  Analogizing states to private parties 
and comparing their respective sophistication ignores this 
justification.  As a result, we find that Louisiana did not waive 
its sovereign immunity when it received a CAFA notice and 
failed to act.   
C. 
 The District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying GSK’s Rule 60(b) motion.  In its briefing before the 
District Court, GSK expressed its belief that another 
organization could have filed a claim on behalf of the State of 
Louisiana.  Because of this suspicion, it asked the claims 
administrator to inform GSK of any claims submitted on 
Louisiana’s behalf.  The claims administrator refused and cited 
its commitment to confidentiality to justify its decision.  After 
the District Court had denied GSK’s motion to enforce the 
settlement agreement, GSK learned that an organization, 
Humana, had submitted a claim on behalf of Louisiana.  Based 
on this information, GSK then moved pursuant to Rule 60(b) 
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on the theory that it had discovered new evidence.  The District 
Court denied this motion.  
 The District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying this motion.  A “court may relieve a party or its legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
for . . . (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable 
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for 
a new trial under Rule 59(b).”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 60.  “That 
standard requires that the new evidence (1) be material and not 
merely cumulative, (2) could not have been discovered before 
trial through the exercise of reasonable diligence and (3) would 
probably have changed the outcome of the trial.”  Compass 
Tech., Inc. v. Tseng Labs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1125, 1130 (3d Cir. 
1995).   
 The District Court found that GSK had not carried its 
burden under the second prong because it did not prove that it 
could not have discovered this information with reasonable 
diligence.  It came to this conclusion because GSK did not 
draw on the Court’s power to recover the discovered 
information and because GSK did not show that it could not 
have received this information with a court order.  GSK has not 
cited a case to support its position that reasonable diligence 
requires less than a court order.  As a result, the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying this motion.  
IV. 
 The Eleventh Amendment applies to the settlement 
agreement and the instant enforcement action.  GSK may not 
avoid the Eleventh Amendment’s prohibition.  Additionally, 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying GSK’s 
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Rule 60(b) Motion.  For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm 
the District Court’s orders.   
